poverty line and also using an arbitrary percentage of the population classified as poor. The tests are of two types: first, a proportionality test using a logistic regression and a lineal probability model; second, an earnings functions comparison after adjustment for sample truncation assuming a normal distribution.
Section V present the analysis for the selft-employed. We take into account the selectivity bias present in the sample by estimating the basic and extended earnings functions using a "Heckit" procedure. We also consider evidence on the extent of labor market segmentation based on the formal versus informal sector dichotomy.
Section VI contains the conclusions.
II . THE DATA
The data used in this analysis are from the 1980 Brazilian census. The original public use file refers to a 3 percent national sample of the population covering 3,256,000 individuals in 808,000 households. Out of this base a sub-sample was drawn of 200,000 individuals in 40,000 households. this file was created by sampling randomly from urban and rural hoeseholds in each of the states in such a way as to maintain a representative distribution of the Brazilian population.
A further selection was made to include only males aged 15 to 65 and who reported positive earnings in their main occupation. 3/ This resulted in a sample size of 39,469 individuals. Furthermore, and in order to make the analysis computationally tractable, a random sample of 4,000 individuals was drawn. We use this sample in our computations. Table 1 presents the mean values for various characteristics of the sample for the whole country along with the definition of the variables.
The mean income for the whole country is 13,448 cruceiros per month. The number of school years completed is 4.33, and the mean age is 33.77 years. Seventy percent live in urban areas, 77 percent are literate and 65 percent are married. Twentynine percent are self-employed and 4 percent are employers. Sao Paulo and the Northeast account for 49 percent of the sample. Mean working time is 46.6 hours per week. Three percent are under the poverty line (1,660 cruceiros per month, based on Vinod, 1982) in the whole country.
Following ENDEF (Estudo Nacional da Despensa Familiar) the country is divided into seven major geographical regions on the basis of the size of the population and their internal similarities. The country is also further divided into urban and rural areas. Appendix Table A-1 presents the mean values for selected characteristics by region an urban/rural location. Regional disparities are striking. For example, mean earnings in the Northeast is 7,668 cruceiros per month or 40 percent of what workers earn in Sao Paulo. Workers in urban areas earn 2.3 times more than those in rural areas. 4/ Also schooling is only 2.65 years in Northeast versus 6.73 years in Distrito (Federal Capital) . Literacy differs dramatically across states, varying from a 48 percent illiteracy rate in the Northeast to an 8 percent illiteracy rate in Rio. Mean hours of work are similar across regions. But in rural areas there are 46 percent self-employed against only 22 percent in the urban areas. Thus self-employment in Brazil concentrates in rural areas.
III. MODELS OF EARNINGS DETERMINATION
Varios models of earningas determination have been advanced in the literature, e.g., Mincer (1958 Mincer ( , 1974 Becker ( 1964); Tinbergen (1951 Tinbergen ( ,1956 ; Ben-Porath (1967) . Maybe the most prominent, as judged by its popularity, is Mincer's (1974) model who used human capital theory to specify the functional form of the earnings function.
The standard human capital earnings function in this model takes the form
(1) ln Y= a 0 + a 1 .S + a 2 .EX + a 3 . EXSQ + u where a 1 provides an estimate of the rate of returns to education which, in this specification, is assumed to be constant across years of schooling. The concavity of the observed age-earnings profile is captured by the quadratic experience terms (EX and EXSQ) whose coefficients, a 2 and a 3 are positive and negative, respectively. Such specification is a pragmatic way of incorporating optimal human capital model into a simple functional form which can be fitted using the limited information available in census-type data 5/. Mincer assumes that of return is a parameter for the individual which, in combination with an assumption about the time path of investiment over the individual's life cycle, leads to the estimable earnings function.
Assume that an individual begins with a stock of human capital E(0) at the age of school entry (t=0). At time t a fraction K(t) of earnings capacity is allocated to investment in human capital and r is the rate of return on such activity for that individual. Then, the instantaneous growth rate of earnings capacity at time t is (2) g(t) = rK(t).
Thus, at time t earnings capacity is
School is an activity in which the individual devotes full time to investment K(t)= 1 for ages 6 through 6+ S. Fron (4) it follows that earnings capacity upon school leaving is (5) E(s) = E(0) exp ( r.S ) If no further investment took place after leaving school, i.e., K(t)=0 for t>s, the individual's life cycle earnings profile would be horizontal at a constant value of Y(S) = E(S). Taking the logarithm of both sides of (5), this implies that the schoolingearnings relationship is of the log-linear form (6) ln Y = ln E (0) + r.S = r.S = b 0 + b 1 . S This simple model assumes no post-school investiments. Theories of optimal human capital accumulation suggest that workers will continue to invest in on-the-jobtraining after leaving school, and that the amount of investment will tend to decline over time.
The earnings function in (1) corresponds (approximately) to the assumption that the fraction of earnings capacity which is invested declines linearly during working life from an inicial value of K(0) at the beginning of the work career to a value of zero at the end of the career.
Such earnings function specification also assumes that all workers have the same own rate of return to investment in human capital and that they all invest the same fraction of their earnings capacity at each level of experience, ie, r and K (EX) are both constant across workers. If workers differ in these characteristics, the estimated rate of return to schooling and the growth rate of earnings may vary across schooling classes. This possibility is captured in the following model We estimate models (1), (6) and (7) for Brazil as a whole, and for each region 6/ using the sample described above. 7/ Table 2, column (2) presents the results of model (6) for the whole country; column (2) presents the results of model (1); and column (3) presents the results of model (7). Column (4) is similar to column (2) but incorporates regional dummies.
The estimated rate of return to schooling, estimated as ###ln Y/###S, is 12 percent in model (6). Omitting experience from the earnings function results in a downward bias in the schooling coefficient because schooling and experience are negatively correlated --at any given age those with more schooling have less experience. The extent of this bias is illustrated in column 2, that gives an estimate of the quadratic earnings function (1), above. In this specification, the estimated rate of returns rises to 16.3 percent. The coefficients of experience and experience squared imply that earnings grows 9.1 percent annually at the beginning of the working life and decrease continuously until they reach zero growth after 35 years of experience. Therefore earnings growth becomes negatives until retirement.
The addition of the experience terms also markedly increases the explanatory power of the model, raising R 2 to 43 percent. The model in (1) asummes that all workers have the same own rate of return to investment and that they all invest the fraction of their earnings capacity at each level of experience.If workers differ in these characteristics the estimated rate of return to schooling, and the growth rate of earnings, may vary across schooling classes. The model fitted in column (3) of Table 2 explores this possibility.
The result indicate that the marginal rate of teturn to schooling decreases for hihger levels of schooling. Evaluating the derivative of log earnings with respec to education at 8 years yields. Estimates of the marginal rate as 16.2 percent at 8 years of schooling, 15.6 percent at 12 years of schooling and 14.9 percent at 16 years. This pattern of decreasing marginal returns is sililar to that found by Hanoch (1967) , Hansen (1963) , Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974) .
The inclusion of regional dummies (column 4) decreases by approximately 1 percent the rate of return. The rate of return is 15 percent, exactly the same as reported by Psacharopoulos (1987) in a recent study of earnings and education in Brazil.
Earnings functions like those reported in Table 2 , especially column 2, have been widely estimated using both cross-sectional and longitudinal data sources from many countries. Psacharopoulos (1985) surveys estimates of the rates of return based on the schooling coefficient in earnings function regressions with the results shown in Table  3 . Our estimates for Brazil, in the 15-16 percent range, are in line with those in other Latin American countries. 
Regional disaggregation
We now procede to a disaggregation of the analysis by region and urban-rural locality. Table 4 presents the results of the classic earnings function ( Model 1 ) by region urban-rural distinction.
The rate of return ranges between 14.1 percent and 16.4 percent. If we compare the returns in the Northeast with the returns in Rio, the difference is 1.97 percent in favor of the Northeast. The Northeast advantage is statistically significant at the 5 percent probability level. The rural advantage is 2 percentage points which is also statistically significant. Thus labor migration has not yet equilibrated the education premium received in different parts of the country. Furthermore, evaluating the Rio and Northeast earning equations at the sample mean of the variables for the country as a whole we obtain an income of 7,712 cruceiros in the Northeast. Thus, controlling for schooling and experience workers in Rio earn 49 percent more than the workers in the Northeast. Evaluating the derivative of the logarithm of income with respec to schooling at the mean schooling and experience in each region we obtain the results reported in Table 6 . The differences are such of an order as to provide evidence of regional segmantation in the Brazilian case. Furthermore, according to model (7) the rate of return to education in rural areas is 3.43 percentage points higher than in urban areas.8/ Source: Based on the rate of return estimates in Table 5 .
IV. TESTING LABOR MARKET DUALITY
At the core of the segmentation hypotesis is the idea that workers with identical human capital characteristics are rewarded differently depending on the segment of the labor market in which they happen to be located, or that the market for secondary (low income) workers differs from the market for primary ( high income) workers.9/ To test such hypotesis a regression is ussually fitted on low-income workers, and the test is whether the effect of education on earnings is significantly lower among secondary relative to primary workers. Such test suffers from a methodological flaw: fitting the regression to a sample that is truncated by the value of the dependent variable results to biased coefficients of the independent variables. Empirical trials with multiple regressions using truncated earnings samples have consistently shown that the coeficients of the human capital variables are biased downwards.10/ Tables 7 and 8 report the results of such an alternative procedures applied to the Brazilian data. In Table 7 we divide the sample into two groups: one consisting of individuals whose monthly earnings is below the poverty line 11/. This criterion results in 3.3 percent of the sample classified as poor. Let us first focus on column (1) to (5) in the two tables reporting results under sample truncation. There are clearly substantial differences in the estimated earnings functions for the two sectors, and these differences are statistically significant. Furthermore, the rate of return to education is lower in the low-wage sector. According to this test, one might conclude that there is dualism in Brazil.
Given that in Table 7 only 3.3 percent of the sample are classified as poor, in Table 8 we use an alternative criterium for samples truncation: the 35th percentile of the income distribution. The cut off point 35 percent is arbitrary, giving 1,400 persons in the lower group and 2,600 persons in the upper group. The results are reported in columns (2) to (5) in Table 8 showing substantial and statistically significant differences in the estimated earnings functions for the two sectors.
Such apparent dualism, however, may simply be due to sample selection bias. As noted by Cain (1976) , Cain and Watts (1973) and Heckman and Hotz (1986) truncation on the dependent variable can produce sharply biased coefficient estimates.
It is possible to correct for the bias using technics developed by Heckman (1976) . In the simple Mincerian model The last term on the right-hand dide of equation (9) is the effect of selection. Estimates in columns (2) and (3) in Tables 7 and 8 omit the final term from the regression equation producing biased stimates of the coefficient. Columns (6) and (7) take into account the last term.
Since in (6') (10) b 0 +b 1 .S + u ### C and (11) u ### C -b 0 -b 1 . S , the last term on the right-hand side of equation (9) can be writen as
which is the conditional expectation of u given the truncation. To correct for truncation bias we assume that the distribution of u is known (say, normal), and obtain a consistent estimate of (12) which is inserted as regressor in the earnings function. Alternatively, it is possible to estimate (9) as a non-linear regression.
In Tables 7 and 8 , columns (6) to (9), we present a test of dual labor market that takes into account the truncation of the dependent variable. We partition the sample into high-income and low-income grups, correct for truncation, and then determine whether the estimated coefficients are statistically different in the two sub-samples.
In Table 7 the correction for truncation of the dependent variable results in all coefficients in column (6) being bigger than in column (2). The coefficients in the high-income sector increase after the correction. The coefficients in column (7) (lowincome) are higher in absolute value than the coefficients in column (3). But notice that, given the standard errors, none but one coefficient difference is significantly different from zero that the 1 percent level. So there is less evidence of labor market duality after controlling for truncation in the dependent variable. Table 8 gives a clear picture. Consider the coefficient of schooling variable which is 14.4 percent of the whole population. When the sample is split it reduces 12.1 percent in the high-income sector and only 2 percent in the low-income sector. This is downward bias due of truncation. When we correct for truncation the coefficient in the high-income sector increases to 18.8 percent and the coefficient in the low-income sector increases to 11.2 percent. The diference before correction is 10 percentage points which is significantly differnt from zero at the 1 percent probabilty level. After correction for truncation the diferece diminishes to 7.7 percent (t-value is 2.82), which is still significant at the 1 percent level. The model yields a positive effect of education on earnings even among the poor, and the effect is significantly lower in the lowincome sector than tahat found among primary workers.
Thus the results thus far somehow support labor market duality, although the extent of it is far less than truncation-uncorrected estimates would suggest. Table 9 presents an alternative test of the dual labor market hypothesis suggested by Heckman and Hotz (1986) . The main feature of the test is that under the null hypothesis of a single labor market, the slope coefficient determining earnings in a regression of the whole population should be proportionally related to the slope coefficient of the model determing the probability that someone is in the low-income sector. Moreover, the constant of proportionality should be the standard deviation of the earnings function fitted over the entire sample of workers.
The probability that someone is poor is If the coefficients of the probability models and the coefficients of the regression in the whole population are not proportional, this is evidence in favor of dual labor markets.
The first column of Table 9 reports the coefficients of an earning function fitted to the whole population. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 9 report the regression coefficients of logistic and linear probabilty regression models in which the dependent variable equals 1 if a person is poor (below the 1,660 cruceiros poverty level) and zero otherwise. The columns give estimates of the parameters of equation (13). Columns (3) and (5) report the ratio of the coefficients of columns (2) and (4) to the coefficients reported in column (1).
Under the nule hypothesis of absence of dual labor market, and under the additional hypothesis that the logistic is the correct specification, all coefficients in column (3) should be equal. Under the nule hypothesis of no dual labor market and under the additional hypothesis that the linear probability model is the correct model, all coefficients in column (5) shold be equal.
All the coefficients are statistically significant in both the earnings and dummy variable regressions, and there are not large discrepancies among the coefficients. We therefore conclude that there is weak evidence of labor market dualism in Brazil. 
IV. FORMAL VS INFORMAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
The test of dualism reported above assumes that poverty status is a perfect clasifier of the the primary and secondary labor market. Clearly, this is a strong assumption.
In this section we investigate the existence of possible segmentation between the formal and informal labor market sector. There are various ways of distinguishing the formal from the informal sector. One possibilty is earnings, although this presents problems: explaining earnings variations within the diferent sectors is one of the purposes of the investigation.
Another criterion is coverage by goverment welfare legislation. But when the employment data come from a household survey it is not possible identify the exact type of unit the respondent is working. A common proxy is payment of social security contributions.12/ A further criterion is to define the formal sector as those in dependent employment and the informal sector as the self-employed. Given the information contained in this data set we experiment with the latter classification. Table 10 presents the mean characteristics of self-employed and employees. The size of the informal sector (self-employed) is 32.8 percent including the employers. Excluding the employers its size is 29.1 percent of the sample. Fifty five percent of the self-employed work in rural areas. The mean earnings of the self-employed is higher than that for employees. If we exclude the employers, the mean income of own account workers is slighthly lower than that for employees.
Schooling is lower among own account workers, and the self-employed. Employers have more education than own account workers and employees.
Self-employed workers earn 17,608 cruceiros per month 6188 more than employees. If we exclude employers from the self-employed group, the latter earn 11,140 cruceiros virtually as much as employees (11, 419) . This finding questions the validity of a segmented labor market theory stating that informal sector jobs (ie., selfemployed) are characterized by lower wages than those of the formal sector (ie., salary employees). Notice that the self-employed have lower education but higher experience than employees. Table 11 gives mean earnings by educational attainment for self-employed and employees, and Table 12 reports earning functions fitted to the two groups of workers. Table 13 extends the Mincerian model by adding the log of hours of work per week, and to dummies variables: URBAN that indicates if the person lives in an urban area, and SOCSEC (Social Security) if a person contributes to it. This last variable proxy for a host of none-measure conditions of employment. Jobs with social security may be better jobs characterized by employment stability. We expect this variable to have a positive and significant influence on earnings. Numbers in parenthesis are standard desviations. Standard deviations in parenthesis 1/ PRIMARY, LOW represents 1 to 4 years of schooling, PRMARY HIGH represents 5 to 8 years of schooling, SECONDARY represents 9 to 12 years of schooling and HIGHER is more than 12 years of schooling.
As seen in Table 12 , there are significant differences between the returns to education for the self-employed and employees, and also the coefficients of experience are significantly different. This finding lends apparent support to the segmented labor market hypothesis, although in favor of the lower segment.
Our estimates suggest higher private returns to education for the self-employed (18.3 percent) versus the wage earners (15.7 percent). The difference is statistically significant. The impact of experience in wage employment is more important that it ia in self-employment. Notes: t-Values in parenthesis * Statistically significant at the 1 percent level or better Table 13 shows the reestimated basic model including the amount of labor supplied (log of hours worked per week), SOCSEC (dummy variable where 1 indicates contributions to any social security scheme, and 0 otherwise) and URBAN (dummy variable where 1 indicates living in urban area, and 0 otherwise).
The returns to schooling and experience for both subsamples change significantly when labor supplied, social security and urban location are added to the equations. The difference between sectors in the coefficient of schooling looses its significance. But the difference in experience continuous to be significantly in favor of the employees. The coefficients of hours per week for the wage workers (0.340) and for the self-employed (0.740) are statistically significant for both groups.
Thus, an encrease in the hours of work per week for the self-employed by one percent raises their monthly earnings by 0.74 percent, while for the wage earners the same raise in hours of work increases their monthly earnings by 0.34 percent.
Selectivity bias
The two subsamples we are working with (employed, self-employed) are the result of self-selection into a particular category due to individual characteristic beyond those measured by our set independent variables. Eg., those who choose to be in self-employment may be more "able", in some respect, relative to those who entered dependent employment.13/ To correct for selectivity bias we use the standard Heckman (1979) procedure. This method consist in a two-stage estimation that arrives at consistent estimates of the earnings function coefficient. First, a probit function is fitted on a limited set of independent variables, determining choice of employment sector, followed by an earnings function containing a selectivity-correction term.14/ We first estimatesd a probit function determining the choice between dependent and self-employment using the following variables: urban, age age squared, years of schooling, contibution to Social Security and single. Thus we assume that the choice of sector of employment depends on the place of current residence, the level of education possesed by the individual, his age, years of scholing, his marital status and if he contributes to Socil Security or not. Next we reestimated the earnings functions conditioned on the choice of sector of employment. Table 14 shows the results of the maximun likelihood estimates of the probit model and Table 15 the OLS earnings function including and adjustment for the probability of being self-employed or employee. The t-statistic on the selectivity factor coeffcient for both the self-employed and employees is highly significant. This means that being self-employed or employee has a significant impact on earnings. The inclusion of the selectivity adjustment factor changes the coefficient of scholing for the self-employed from 0.183 to 0.163relative to the basic specification. The coefficient of experience chenges from 0.077 to 0.98. For the employees the coefficient of scholing changes from 0.157 to0.155 and the coefficient of experience from 0.096 to 0.105. This means that our previous estimate of the education coefficient was upwardly biased and the experince coefficients was downwardly biased. Most important, before the adjustment the difference in coefficients between self-employed and employees was significant but the adjustment the difference is not statistically significant.
Thus, the returns to schooling for the self-employed are statistically equivalent to those of salaryworkers or, the size of the returns to schooling found in many studies in less-developed countries do not appear to be result of the systematic exclesion of the self-employed from the sample -at least in Brazilian case. This finding is contrary to the conclusions drawn by Chiswick (1976) . Table 16 presents the results of the extended earnings functions including the adjustment for self-selection. Again we detect the existence of an upward bias relative to the basic estimates, as well as in the impact of hours of work on the earnings of employees and self-employed workers. On the other hand, we verify that the coefficients of Social Security downwardly biased in the original regressions.
The results show that the returns to schooling for the self-employed are statistically equivalent to those of wage and salary workers. 
Different Types of Self-Employment
Thus far we considered the self-employed as one group. However, 11 percent of them are "employers" (with one or more hired workers) and 89 percent "own account" (working alone) individuals. Table 10 , above, presented the basic characteristics of the two groups.
Employers are on average older, more educated and work more hours than own account workers. Employers earn substantially more -six time as much -than own account workers. In order to examine whether these differences in earnings imply a differential effect of education on earnings, we reestimated the earnings functions presented above for the two types of self-employment.
In Table 17 the returns to education are different for employers and own account workers. But the returns to education behave quite differently for the two groups when controlling for place of residence, contribution to Social Security and hours of work. The coefficient of the education variable(years of schooling), in the own account regression drops 5.4 percentage points compared to our previus results, while the same coefficient for the employers remains almost unchanged. Table 17 shows that employers and own account workers realize similar returns, 10 percent and 11 percent, respectively relative to those engaged in more conventional types of employment (employees, 12 percent).
There is one important conclusion from the analysis of this section: Before adjustement for selectivity bias the difference in coefficients between self-employed and employees was statistically significant (apparent evidence in favor of the segmented labor market hypotesis), but after the adjustment the difference is not statistically significant.
In summary, against what is usually proposed in the formal / informal sector literature, the coefficient of years of schooling in the probit model indicates that education by itself is not an importent factor determining the choice of sector of employment. Also, the returns to education are similar in the formal/ informal sectors. This means that those employed in the informal sector make full use of their human capital stocks and, according to our estimates, realize returns on their education similar to those who are engaged in more conventional types of employment. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented fresh empirical evidence on the determinants of earnings of Brazilian males. We focused on three issues that are frecuently alleged to play an important role in accounting for earnings inequality and variation, especially in lessdeveloped countries: regional inequality, labor market segmentation and formal vs. informal sector employment.
Our findings suggest the following conclusions. First, the rate of return to schooling is sizeable and higher in Brazil than in advanced countries. Rates of return to schooling in rural areas are 3.4 percentage points higher than in urban areas.
Second, we find strong regional differences in estimated earnings functions. This finding indicates that labor migration has not yet wiped out earnings differences between regions and labor markets may be geographically segmented.
Third, when we employ traditional estimation procedures (e.g., Mincer### s'model) or truncate the dependent variable using an earnings value (e.g., poor, nonpoor) we arrive at evidence of labor market segmentation. However, when using an earnings-independent criterion (e.g., formal, informal sector) to split the sample we fail to document evidence of labor market segmentation. Those employed in the informal sector make full use of the human capital stock and realize returns similar to those engaged in more conventional types of employment. 
APPENDIX

NOTES
1/ In the development literature, the best-known studies of regional inequalitu are those of Kuznets (1963) and Williamson (1965) . Also see Fields and Schultz (1980) . 2/ See Cain (1976) for survey. For some recent studies see Fields (1980) , Mazundar (1983) and House (1984) . 3/ Most males participate more or less continuously in the labor force. We consider only males because women are less likely to have worked continuously, aand to avoid the complication of selectivity regarding which females participate in the labor force. 4/ Denslow and Tyler (1983) observe that wages in the Northeast average less than half of those in the Southeast for decades. They partly attribute this to the fact that labor in the Northeast is less qualified and the substantial regional differences in the cost of living. They conclude that "all in all, the persistence of such enormous regional disparities remains a puzzle". 5/ See Willis (1986) . 6/ It should be noted that disaggregation of the returns to schooling by region introduces sample truncation bias. The reason is that once educated, individuals realize their productivity and earnings potencial by moving across regions. 7/ Following a large body of empirical literature we estimate the equations by ordinary least squared. Reserch by Griliches and Mason (1972) and in the literature surveyed by Jenks (1972) , Chamberlain and Griliches (1977) , and Griliches (1977) found small ability effects. The estimates are not altered using more sophisticated estimation methods. 8/ Behrman and Birdsall (1983) provide a possible partial explanation of this result by showing that the standar approach (no consideration for school quality) overstates regional and urban-rural differentials for equally schooled individuals. But the magnitude of the explained differential persist even after controlling for quality. They also recognize factors like price differentials ( Thomas, 1982) , labor market disequilibria and possibly migration selectivity and migration costs as other explanation of the earnings differentials. 9/ For a survey of dual labor market theory see Cain (1976) . For different aspects of the theory see Piore (1983) , Mazundara (1983), Elbaum (1983) , House (1984) , Doeringer and Piore (1971) and the references cited therein. 10/ See Crawfor (1975) . 11/ The poverty line is defined to be income sufficient to buy a basket of food to meet minimun caloric requirements and to buy a basket of non-food, items that satisfied minimun standars. See Vinod (1982) for an extensive discussion of the construction of the poverty line. We use the poverty line for Brazil calculated by Vinod (1982) pp. 85 column, Total Expenditures Poverty Lines A+A´. This poverty line was 1,953 cruceiros of 1974 per annum. We transform the poverty line to monthly cruceiros of 1980 using the consumer prices for Brazil arriving at a figure of 1,660 monthly cruceiros. 12/ Used in Merrick (1976) .
13/ An early discussion of the self-selectivity problem is Roy (1951) . The econometric discussion of the consecuencies of he self-selectivity began with the study of Heckman (1974) . Self-selectivity has more recently been analized in different contexts by Lee and Trost (1978) , Willis and Rosen (1979) , Griliches (1978) and Kenny (1979) among others. 14/ For more details see Heckman (1980) .
